Abstract-Software Defined Networking (SDN) brings numbers of advantages along with many challenges. One particular concern is on the control-plane resilience, while the existing protection approaches proposed for SDN networks mainly focus on data-plane. In order to achieve the carrier-grade recovery from link failures, we adopt the dedicated protection scheme towards finding optimal protection routing for control-plane traffic. To this end, we study a weighted cost minimization problem, in which the traffic load balancing and flow table rule placement are jointly considered when selecting protection paths for controller-switch sessions. Because this problem is known as NP-hard, we propose a Markov approximation based combinatorial optimization approach for routing protection in SDN control-plane, which produces near-optimal solution in a distributed fashion. We then extend our solution to an online case that can handle the single-link failure one at a time. The induced performance fluctuation is also analyzed with theoretical derivation. Extensive experimental results show that our proposed algorithm has fast convergence and high efficiency in resource utilization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software Defined Networking (SDN) offers programmable features and functionalities (e.g., Openflow [1] ) to dynamically manage network and process packets in switches by shifting the control plane to centralized controllers. Thus, network operators may conduct flexible management easily and fast by realizing a number of optimal network policies, e.g., traffic engineering [2] , security [3] , fault diagnosis [4] and failure recovery (failover) [5] .
In SDN networks, the connection between any pair of switch and controller is used to exchange control-plane traffic, e.g., OpenFlow messages and the collected global network statistics [1] . The global network information is critical for controlling policy to make decisions. Network statistics shall be collected as much as possible, such as the traffic rate in each link, available flow-table size in each forwarding hardware, and reported to the controller via secure channels. Controller may respond with new instructions to each device. Such the bidirectional communications contribute to the control traffic by a non-negligible fraction [6] .
A. Motivation
A controller usually interacts with SDN switches via out-ofband control connections (also called channels) in a dedicated network. However, in a large-scale network, an alternative less expensive way is using the in-band control connection, in which a controller establishes communication with a switch through a path consisting of other intermediate switches that relay the control-plane traffic. Although such an approach brings obvious advantages, it also comes with many challenges. One particular issue is how to provide resilient communications between data-plane and control-plane in case of link failures. In an in-band SDN network, where control-plane traffic shares links with data-plane traffic, even a single link failure [5] may disconnect a large number of switches from their controllers, resulting in much worse damage than the out-ofband case. To better understand this, we illustrate an example in Fig. 1 , where switches connect to a remote controller via inband multi-hop relay connections. If link (0,2) fails, switches 2, 4 and 5 will lose connections with the remote controller. Consequently, packet may not be proceed correctly in the control-lost switches, thus inducing performance degradation in data-plane, such as packet losing, loop routing, suboptimal or infeasible routing decisions [1] , [4] .
B. Alternative Schemes to Provide Dependability
There are mainly two schemes to address recovery problem: restoration and protection [7] . In the former scheme, the recovery paths can be either preplanned or calculated on-demand, but resources (i.e., forwarding rules and link bandwidth) are not allocated until a failure occurs. Such an approach usually induces long recovery time and packet loss. In the latter scheme, backup resources are always pre-planned and reserved such that once failure occurs, recovery can be made immediately. As a result, when fast recovery is a major concern, the protection scheme is preferred and will be studied in this paper.
C. Aimed Target
When applying the routing protection to the in-band SDN networks, two design issues should be carefully considered.
Since control-plane traffic shares the bandwidth resource with data-plane traffic in the in-band SDN networks, the first issue is to provide guaranteed bandwidth to control traffic and at the same time, more importantly, the protection-based routing for control traffic needs to optimize its bandwidth utilization such that the network performance, which is decided by data-plane traffic can be maximized. One way to achieve this goal is to balance the control traffic, i.e., the maximum bandwidth used for control traffic over all links is to be minimized.
Another issue is the management of Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAM) in SDN switches. Recall that when a control connection is established, switches must be installed with a proper set of rules associated with userdefined lifetime for the subsequent control traffic, and must maintain these rules in their TCAM until they expire and thus are removed [1] . While TCAM supports high-speed parallel lookup processing, it is an expensive hardware and extremely power-hungry [8] . Consequently, the placement of rules in protection based routing for control traffic should also be considered.
To this end, we study a weighted cost minimization problem, in which the control-plane traffic load balancing and rule placement are jointly considered when selecting protection paths for control channels in an in-band SDN network. Since the multiple resource constrained routing is known as NPcomplete [9] , [10] , we propose a distributed near-optimal algorithm using Markov approximation technique [11] . Particularly, we extend our solution to an on-line case that can handle the dynamic single-link failure one at a time. The induced performance fluctuation is also analyzed with theoretical derivation. Finally, extensive experiments are conducted to show that our proposed algorithm has fast convergence and is more efficient in the resource utilization perspective than the existing benchmark approaches.
D. Major Contributions
In summary, our study leads to the following major contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that conducts the optimal routing protection for control-plane traffic in the in-band SDN networks.
• We propose a distributed near-optimal algorithm for the weighted cost minimization problem mentioned above using Markov approximation technique. In particular, we design a Markov chain with a state space of all feasible protection paths and a well devised transition rate matrix such that the theoretical performance of the proposed algorithm can be guaranteed.
• Compared with the existing benchmark approaches, our proposed algorithm can prove higher robustness and efficiency by handling the single-link failure with fast convergence. The theoretical performance fluctuation of our algorithm due to single-link failure is also thoroughly studied with closed-form expression. The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews related work. Section III introduces the preliminaries and system model. Then, the original optimization problem is formulated using integer programming. Our proposed nearoptimal Markov approximation based distributed algorithm is specified in Section IV. Further, Section V extends our proposed algorithm to dynamically deal with single-link failures. Extensive evaluation results are shown in Section VI. Finally, section VII concludes this work and reveals future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In the literature, the link failure recovery schemes mostly for the data-plane of SDN networks can be mainly classified into three categories: restoration [12] , [13] , cold-backup protection [12] - [14] and hot-backup protection [15] .
A. Classification of Failure-Recovery Strategies
Restoration. Sharma et al. [12] , [13] presented restoration mechanisms in OpenFlow networks. In case of link failure, controller reacts to the link failure according to the following steps: (a) removes the affected rules, (b) computes backup paths, and (3) installs the new required rules.
Cold-backup protection. In this protection, only the forwarding rules are allocated from the beginning, but traffic is not redirected to the backup paths until the failure occurs. For example, in the same work [12] , [13] , authors also implemented the group table based fast-failover mechanism [1] in OpenFlow network. Backup paths are pre-computed and installed to group table. Their experimental findings show that path protection is more qualified than restoration with respect to the sub-50 ms fast failure recovery requirement [16] of carrier-grade networks. Moreover, Borokhovich et al. [14] introduced the classic graph search algorithms, e.g., depthfirst search and breadth-first search algorithms, into OpenFlow networks based on the same fast-failover functionality using group table. The controller invokes one of these algorithms to compute backup paths, along which routing rules are preinstalled into the group-table of switches.
Hot-backup protection. In this scheme, the bandwidth resource of backup paths is fully allocated from the beginning, such that the backup paths carry the same traffic as the primary working path to avoid disruption of connection. For example, authors in [15] apply '1+1' protection to the data-plane of an OpenFlow network, where backup paths are pre-configured and carry the duplicated traffic. Thus, destination-switch can still receive packets when a link failure occurs.
B. Comparison with Our Work
We have the following observations on the conventional routing-resilience approaches. 1) They do not specifically address the control-plane routing protection, therefore the load balance and the forwarding rule cost in the controlplane are not considered. 2) None of them can provide an optimal fast recovery solution when single-link failure occurs in large-scale networks. To fill this gap, we propose a Markov approximation based combinatorial optimization approach for routing protection in SDN control-plane, which produces nearoptimal solution in a distributed fashion. 
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Preliminary and System Model
In this paper, we consider the Dedicated Backup Path Protection (DBPP) scheme [17] , [18] , which belongs to hotbackup protection. For example, one popular DBPP is the '1+1' protection [7] , [12] , [19] , where a working path is protected by one dedicated backup path and traffic is duplicated on both the working path and the backup path. Note that, our proposed approach is a general framework that can be applied to other recovery mechanisms as well.
In our system model, every controller-to-switch channel (also calledp controller-switch session) needs to be established in an in-band fashion. Given a set of controller-switch sessions S in an SDN network G = (V, E) with switch set V and link set E, each controller-switch session s ∈ S is equipped with a set of required in-use paths, denoted as D s , which includes one working path and |D s | − 1 backup paths. For example, in Fig. 2 , all in-use paths for session s between controller C and switch s m at time t are listed as (s,1), (s,2), · · · , (s,|D s |). Note that, the adopted DBPP scheme belongs to shared-link protection [17] , and therefore the provided candidate paths J s for each session s should be as disjointed as possible. The reason we give this assumption is that both the primary working path and backup paths are not likely to fail at the same time by a link-failure when the provided candidate paths are highly disjointed. However, we do not fucus our attentions on how to find the sufficient disjointed candidate path set for each session in this paper. On the other hand, we denote the link bandwidth capability as c l∈E . The currently available link bandwidth towards control-plane traffic can be presented by (c l − d l , l ∈ E). The major notations used in this paper are shown in Table I .
B. Problem Formulation
Under this model, we now study the Control-Plane Routing Protection (shorten as CPRP) problem stated and formulated as follows.
1) Path Selection:
The target of CPRP problem is to find the optimal path set for all controller-switch sessions. To denote whether candidate path p ∈ J s is selected by session s ∈ S as one of its required in-use paths, we define a binary variable z system cost of a session s ∈ S under configuration f ∈ F .
u f overall system cost under a given configuration f ∈ F , i.e., u f = s∈S us(f ).
With this definition, the entire decision space of all possible path-selection can be expressed as:
2) Minimization of Joint Weighted System Cost: SDN network operators perform traffic engineering to improve resource utilization, which is normally measured in terms of two objectives:
• Ensure load balance by decreasing the aggregated traffic load on most severely congested links.
• Reduce the node cost which measures the average number of forwarding rules installed in switches. Consequently, the overall weighted system cost described in our objective function includes two terms: 1) the maximum rate of control traffic over all links, and 2) the average TCAM consumption on all traversed switches.
As a result, the CPRP problem is formulated as the following constrained integer programming optimization:
s.t.:
Objective function (1a) is the proposed overall weighted system cost that captures both of the two objectives discussed above. In such the objective function, the first term max l∈E (r l ) denotes the maximum rate of control traffic over all links while the second term 1 |V| s∈S p∈Js z p s · |p| indicates the average forwarding rule cost in each traversed switch. Note that, |p| also represents the TCAM consumption measured in unit rule size on all switches along path p. Furthermore, the tradeoff between these two terms of cost is allowed to be freely tuned by introducing a weighting factor ω. Constraint (1b) claims that for each session s, exact |D s | number of in-use paths must be selected from its candidate path set J s . Then, (1c) calculates the aggregated traffic rate on each link, as the sum of traffic demand from all passing-through sessions. The capacity constraints on links and nodes are specified by constraints (1d) and (1e), respectively.
IV. DISTRIBUTED NEAR-OPTIMAL PATH SELECTION ALGORITHM
Path selection under constrained resource is known as NPcomplete problem [9] , [10] . The CPRP problem is a combinatorial optimization, in which the global optimal solution consists of distributed local path-selection decision. Since there is no computationally efficient solution in a centralized manner, we strive for designing a distributed algorithm that solves the problem following the framework of Markov approximation technique [11] . In the following, we specify the two steps in designing our algorithm under the Markov approximation framework: log-sum-exp approximation and distributed implementation of Markov chains.
A. Log-Sum-Exp Approximation Approach
Let f = {z p s , ∀p ∈ J s , ∀s ∈ S} denote a configuration for the CPRP problem, and F the set of all feasible configurations that are already known. For convenience of presentation, we denote u f as the system objective function (1a) corresponding to a given configuration f . To better understand the log-sumexp approximation, we also let each configuration f ∈ F associate with a probability p f , indicating the percentage of time that the configuration f is in use. Then, CPRP can be approximated by the following optimization problem via applying the approximation technique in [11] :
where β is a large positive constant and related to the performance of this approximation approach. Note that, the motivation behind this approximation is that it potentially leads to distributed solutions. Let p * f ∈F be the optimal solution of the CPRP(β) problem, λ denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the equality constraint in (2) under p * f . Then, by solving the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [20] of the problem in (2):
we obtain the optimal solution:
Remark 1: With the log-sum-exp approximation approach described above, we obtain an approximate version of the CPRP problem with the assistance of an entropy term 1 β f ∈F p f log p f . If we can time-share among different configurations according to the optimal solution p * f shown in (4), then CPRP can be solved approximately within a bound 1 β log |F |, which can be made small by choosing large β.
B. Markov Chain Design
Here we devise a Markov Chain (shorten as MC thereafter) with a state space being the set of all feasible configurations F and a stationary distribution denoted as p * f in (4) . Since the system is operated under different configurations, the transitions between two states in the designed MC indicate swapping in-use paths of each session. Therefore, in the implemented MC, if the transitions among states can be controlled to converge to the desired stationary distribution p * f , system can achieve near-optimal performance.
To construct a time-reversible MC [11] with stationary distribution p * f , we let f, f ′ ∈ F denote two states of MC, and use q f,f ′ as the nonnegative transition rate from state f to f ′ . Furthermore, we have to ensure: (a) in the resulting MC, any two states are reachable from each other, and (b) the detailed balance equation
should be satisfied. Our design is as follows. 1) State-Space-Structure: Recall that a configuration f ∈ F represents a set of in-use paths used by all sessions. Initially, we set the transition rate between two configurations f and f ′ to be 0, unless they satisfy the following two conditions: T ← initializes a dedicated processing-thread forš 5: Dš ← |Dš| feasible paths randomly selected from Jš 6: end for 7 generates a random exponentially distributed timer T s for thread s with mean equal to
and begins counting down 16: sends a RESET signal to other threads. 17 : end for 18: Procedure Stage 2: RESET 19: if dedicated thread s ∈ T receives a RESET message then 20: with u f ′ , controller refreshes timer T s according to (6) , and begins to count down 21 24: repeats Stage 1 only for thread s. 25: end if transition rate q f,f ′ positively correlated to the difference of system performance under two adjacent configurations f and f ′ in the state matrix. In detail, the transition rate q f,f ′ is designed as:
where τ is a conditional positive constant that avoids overflow computing of exp(.) in computer. The design of q f,f ′ in (5), in practice, is likely to make system switch to a configuration with better performance. This is because when s∈S (u s (f ) − u s (f ′ )) > 0 and the performance gap between f and f ′ is greater, the transition rate q f,f ′ will be bigger, and vice versa. 
C. Implementation of MC Guided Algorithm
The implementation based on our designed Markov chain is shown in Algorithm 1, in which controller will create a dedicated processing-thread for each of its holding sessions. Therefore, this algorithm can execute on single controller or multiple distributed controllers, which can apportion all the processing-threads. We will consider how to allocate the threads to controllers in our future work. Each of such threads follows a general state machine as shown in Fig. 3 , by which we explain the procedures of this algorithm for the singlecontroller case as follows.
• Initialization: For each sessionš ∈ S, controller creates a dedicated thread included in set T, then randomly selects |Dš| feasible not-in-use paths that satisfy resource requirement from candidate path set Jš.
• Stage 1: Let f and f ′ denote the current and next targeting configuration, respectively. For each thread s ∈ T, controller first randomly selects one feasible path from the not-in-use paths (i.e., J s \D s ), and one in-use path from D s . The system cost of current configuration u f is can be measured by the controller, which then estimates the performance of the targeting configuration, i.e., u f ′ , if these two paths p old and p new are swapped. Afterwards, the controller swaps them, and meanwhile triggers an exponentially distributed timer T s for thread s with a mean value of
|Ds|·(|Js|−|Ds|) . In the last step, the controller sends a RESET signal to other threads to notify them of the updated system cost u f ′ .
• Stage 2: When a thread s ∈ T receives a RESET signal, the controller terminates timer T s , and refreshes a new one according to (6) with the updated u f ′ . The proof is relegated to Appendix-A. Further, we make some notable remarks:
Remark 2: Our proposed algorithm can be extended to other traffic engineering problems in SDN systems, e.g., finding the protection routing paths for data plane traffics between any pair of core switches, with a different utility function.
Remark 3: Because this algorithm is executed in a distributed manner for each session, it can be also applied to more practical scenarios where multiple controllers are deployed over large-scale networks. This requires the system to know where only one session changes a single path, its holding controller only has to notify this event to all other "invariant" controllers. Then, the "next" target system performance s∈S u s (f ′ ) can be estimated immediately in each controller.
V. DYNAMIC HANDLING AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS UNDER SINGLE-LINK FAILURE In this section, we extend our proposed Algorithm 1 to the on-line case that handles the dynamic single-link failure [5] . Then, the theoretical performance fluctuation induced by such link failure is presented.
A. Operations When Link Fails
When a single link fails, any candidate paths and in-use paths which include the failed link become invalid and should be removed for each session. Since we assume that single link can fail at a time, there is always at least one in-use path working for each session. Therefore, the connection between controller and any switch will not be disturbed. Then, we present the additional operations with respect to single-link failure in Algorithm 2.
After removing all invalid paths in Step 1, Step 2 fills up the vacancy of desired in-use paths and ensures of control traffic protection. Finally, other sessions should be notified of the updated overall system cost via RESET signals to refresh their timers in Step 3. Then, the controller continues executing Stage 2 of Algorithm 1. In addition, it is worth noting that the controller could deploy the required protection paths according to a suboptimal solution after link failure and before the convergence of Algorithm 1.
B. Theoretical Performance Fluctuation of Single-Link Failure
When the invalid paths are removed, the configurations involving those paths should be deleted from the original configuration hopping Markov chain M . LetM denote the new Markov chain after removing all invalid configurations based on M , and G as the survived configuration space in M . Accordingly, the disappeared configuration space is F \G. For example, as shown in Fig. 4 , when link (4,5) fails, any configuration including this link, e.g., f 3 , will be moved into F \G. The remaining configurations f 1 , f 2 , · · · are moved to G. Note that, it is not hard to prove thatM is still irreducible. We are particularly interesting in the robustness of the proposed Algorithm 1 in the on-line case. This motivates us to further study the performance fluctuation from the state when link failure just occurs to the converged performance inM .
At first, the stationary distribution of the configurations in M is denoted by q
. Furthermore, we define another vectorq : [q g (u), g ∈ G] to indicate the distribution of configurations g ∈ G in M when link failure just occurs and before the Step 3 of Alg. 2. We use the total variation distance [21] d T V (q * ,q) to quantify the distribution difference of all configurations g ∈ G betweenM and M . Then, we have the following lemmas.
Lemma 1: (a) The total variation distance between q * and q is bounded by:
(b) By denoting S 1 ⊆ S as the set of sessions which lost a candidate path due to the link-failure, and S im ⊆ S 1 as an imaginary set of sessions which select the disappeared path if it still exists, we have
where J s , D s are the path sets for session s ∈ S before link failure, and
The proof is relegated to Appendix-B. Based on Lemma 1, we then study a special case in the next subsection.
C. Further Case Study under '1+1' Protection Scheme
Now, we proceed to study a special case, which is named as '1+1' protection with equal number of available candidate paths. We adopt the '1+1' protection mechanism [7] , [12] and particularly provide each session with the same number of initial candidate paths, i.e., |J s | is same for ∀s ∈ S in the initial stage of controller connection setup. In addition, when single-link failure occurs, in order to ensure there is at least one candidate path can be swapped to find alternative solution for each session, we assume that (|J s |−1)−|D s | ≥ 1, ∀s ∈ S. In consequence, equation (8) can be rewritten as:
Then, letting u max = max g∈G u g , we obtain the following theoretical bound of performance perturbation under this special case when single-link failure occurs. Note that, u max is the theoretical performance of the solution obtained by solving the maximization version of the CPRP problem.
Theorem 2: The performance perturbation of single-link failure under the special case '1+1' protection with equal number of available candidate paths is bounded by:
The proof is relegated to Appendix-C.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup and Methodology
Simulation topologies:
We have implemented a simulator in Python to emulate the SDN networks with in-band control. Two groups of simulations are conducted under a Fat-tree topology with 26 nodes and 50 bidirectional links (shown in Fig. 5(a) ) and a CORONET [22] topology with 60 nodes and 79 bidirectional links (shown in Fig. 5(b) ). Particularly, only one controller is deployed in the former topology, while there are 4 controllers A, B, C and D, deployed in the latter one. Since the switch node which connects to a controller directly acts as gateway, the number of controller-switch sessions in the Fat-tree topology is 25 in total. In CORONET, the number of sessions reaches 224, and traffic becomes more intense and easier to be congested than that in Fat-tree.
Benchmarks: Two benchmark algorithms are used to compare the performance with our proposed Alg. 1. K-shortest path algorithm [10] , [23] , [24] is a classical static heuristic, in which each session is provisioned with k sequential shortest paths from the given candidate path set. The other one is called Alg. Iterative [25] in this paper, and also designed by using Markov approximation technique. In Alg. Iterative, although the system is similarly allowed to transit from one configuration to another by swapping one pair of paths only, the transition rate is designed as q f →f ′ ∝ exp −1 (−βu f ′ ). Furthermore, it keeps tracing the best configuration observed so far which is used as the final solution. Finally, the optimal solutions are solved by utilizing the Gurobi optimizer [26] .
Other settings and metrics: Simulations are conducted under on-line dynamic case with occurrence of single-link failure. The traffic demand of each controller-switch session and the link bandwidth capacity are randomly generated within a given range. Before executing algorithms, by invoking a simple depth-first path finding algorithm, we try to provide each controller-switch session s ∈ S with a number |J s | of highly-disjointed and intensively link-jointed candidate paths under Fat-tree and CORONET topologies, respectively. Under fixed ω = 1, τ = 1 and β = 10, we select a number |D s | = 2 of paths as in-use paths by executing our proposed algorithm and other benchmark algorithms. Note that, the weighted numerical joint system cost is defined as the summation of both the maximum link overhead measured in traffic rate (Mb/s) and the average node overhead measured in the average number of installed forwarding rules at each traversed switch. In order to compare the effectiveness of algorithms, we also trace the maximum node overhead, which is measured by the number of forwarding rules installed in the most heavily loaded switch node.
B. Performance with Highly-Disjointed Candidate Paths under Fat-tree Topology
We first study the performance of algorithms under the Fattree topology, where the only controller directly connects to gateway node 0, and indirectly connects to other switch nodes via the in-band connections. The control-plane traffic demand of each session is randomly generated within range [1, 15] Mb/s, and the link bandwidth capability for both controlplane and date-plane traffic in each link is assigned to 1000 Mb/s. Furthermore, in order to emulate the dynamic bandwidth condition, the available bandwidth for control-plane traffic in each link is updated every logical second within a range. The lower bound of the range is the total bandwidth that has been already allocated to all the passing in-use control paths, while the upper bound is the link bandwidth capability.
1) Representative Execution Case of Algorithms:
By fixing |J s |=5, |D s |=2 for each session, the simulation result shown in Fig. 6 illustrates the numerical system cost over a logical period [0, 15 seconds]. A single-link failure occurs in link (0,3) at time 10. Note that, (0,3) is one of the most critical links under the Fat-tree topology, and thus its failure brings the very bad damage to the candidate paths. Before linkfailure, we observe that our proposed algorithm converges to the optimal performance with a cost 93 in the initial 0.5 seconds. In contrast, K-shortest algorithm keeps a high system cost around 160. Although the best solution of Alg. Iterative is traced at around 7.5 logical time, this algorithm shows a fluctuant performance all the time. Thus it is ambiguous when its best solution can be obtained. On the contrary, the nearoptimal solution can be traced quickly using our proposed Alg. 1 because of its fast convergence. As shown in at logical 0.3 second in the simulation, we get the converged near-optimal solution. Then, when the single-link failure occurs, the cost fluctuation is observed under all algorithms. The failed link shrinks the candidate path set and in-use path set for each session. As a result, the updated in-use paths are selected by sharing more common links, making the total system cost grows high. Comparing the fluctuation gaps of algorithms, we find that our proposed algorithm has smaller one than other two algorithms. Moreover, its performance converges to the optimal solution quickly at 11.5 logical time. However, the Kshortest algorithm still holds the highest cost and Alg. Iterative shows a bigger perturbation. On the other hand, when the link-failure just occurs, the cost of our Sojourn-and-Transit algorithm is shown to be 148, and the converged cost is Furthermore, in the same group of simulation shown in Fig. 6 , the second, third and bottom figures demonstrate the maximum link overhead (in terms of aggregated controlplane traffic rate (Mb/s)), the average node overhead and the maximum node overhead (in terms of number of installed forwarding rules), respectively. Note that, the joint system cost is calculated by summing the two overhead items that are shown in the middle two figures. Overall, all the three overheads show the similar performance with the joint system cost. However, in the bottom figure with respect to the maximum node overhead, we observe that the K-shortest algorithm interestingly maintains a quite low level before linkfailure. This is because the K-shortest algorithm always selects the former |D s | shortest candidate paths for each session. Consequently, the total number of installed rules is very low. After link failure, due to shrunken candidate path space, some longer paths have to be selected, making the probability that a switch is assigned with large number of rules become higher than before. For example, we observe that the maximum node overhead of K-shortest increases from 50 to 120 when link failure occurs.
2) Performance in the Initial Stage: Now, we study the performance of algorithms in the initial connection-setup stage of control-plane traffic. In this group of simulation, each parameter setting is evaluated with 100 instances. By fixing |J s | = 5, |D s | = 2 and varying the solution tracing time from 0.1 second to 2 seconds, we record the cost of the best solution for all algorithms. From Fig. 7(a) , we observe that the performance of all algorithms are similar when the solution-tracing time is 0.1 second. However, the proposed Alg. 1 shows the overwhelming advantage over the other two benchmark algorithms when the solution-tracing time grows, and it converges to the optimal solution when tracing time exceeds 1 second.
Since convergence only occurs when using Alg. 1, we further study the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of its convergence time by varying the candidate path scale |J s | within {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. Such results are shown in Fig.  7(b) , in which it can be observed that approximate 45% of convergence times are within the first 1 second and over 90% of convergence times are shorter than 5 seconds when |J s | ≥ 5. On the other hand, the near-optimal solution yield by Alg. 1 becomes more difficult to find while |J s | < 5, leading to the convergence time increases higher accordingly.
3) Performance under Single-Link Failure: Next, we study the influence introduced by single-link failure while applying Alg. 1. Based on the same settings as the former group of simulation, we compare the performance of Alg. 1 between the initial convergence stage (Init.) and the stage after-link-failure (a.l.f.). The average system costs of Alg. 1 in both stages are compared in Fig. 8(a) . Note that, here |J s | is the number of candidate paths before single-link failure, and varies from 4 to 7 due to the adopted '1+1' protection. We see that there is an increment of approximate 20 unit of system cost with each |J s | under a.l.f. case. Fig. 8(b) shows the CDF of system cost fluctuation a.l.f. of Alg. 1. We surprisingly find that the fluctuation is positively proportional to |J s |. For example, 90% of the cost fluctuation is less than 30 when |J s | = 4, but this percentage reduces to 75%, 48%, and 25% when |J s | = 5, 6, 7, respectively. Here, our understanding is that the probability of meeting very bad configurations becomes higher at the timeslot when link failure occurs, under the situation that more candidate paths are being provided. However, all the observed cost fluctuations are within the theoretical bound described in Theorem 2. Then, in Fig. 8(c) , the convergence time a.l.f. is observed larger than that in the initial stage. This is because the decreased candidate paths make the best configuration found in a longer time. We also see that the average convergence time is less than 5 seconds when |J s | ≥ 5. Further, Fig. 8(d) illustrates the CDFs of convergence time a.l.f.. We see that the convergence times are almost same when |J s | = 5, 6, 7 and better than that under |J s | = 4.
In summary, although a large candidate path set increases the cost fluctuation, it benefits the convergence time after link failure.
C. Performance with Intensively Link-Jointed Candidate Paths under Coronet Topology
We also evaluate the robustness of our proposed algorithm under the harsh context that the disjointed candidate paths can not be provided in the Coronet of the low out/in-degree of most switch nodes. Consequently, only the intensively link-jointed candidate paths are provided for each session. Furthermore, we also deploy 4 controllers over the topology to multiply the total number of sessions by 4 times (56 × 4 = 224). In this group of simulation, the control-plane traffic demand of each session is randomly generated within [1, 10] Mb/s, and the link bandwidth capacity is initialized to 10000 Mb/s. The currently available link bandwidth for control-plane traffic is randomly updated every logical unit time within the range of link bandwidth capacity. Fig. 9(a) shows the execution case conducted under Coronet topology without link-failure. Different from the former group of simulation that has been conducted under Fat-tree topology, more performance perturbations are observed. The reason is that many of the provided candidate paths share common links under the Coronet topology, leading to the probability that system switches to a worse configuration high. However, our proposed Alg. 1 still maintains a fast convergence performance and achieves lower system costs than K-shortest and Alg. Iterative. It also has a lower maximum link overhead and average/maximum node overhead.
Particularly, Fig. 9(b) and Fig. 9(c) demonstrate the CDFs of all the traced maximum link and node overheads under the same group of simulation shown in Fig. 9(a) . From both figures, we can observe that Alg. 1 illustrates a more excellent solution-finding capability achieving 10%-20% lower cost/overhead when compared with benchmarks.
In summary, from all the simulation results described above, we can always observe that our proposed Sojourn-and-Transit algorithm outperforms other two benchmark algorithms significantly and has a near-optimal performance. It also converges fast under the scenarios with either single-link failure or dynamic available resource.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, in order to ensure fast recovery of the controlplane traffic in in-band SDN networks, we study a joint weighted cost minimization problem, in which the traffic load balancing and rule placement are jointly considered when selecting protection paths for control-plane traffic in an in-band network. To solve this multiple resource constrained routing problem efficiently, we propose a near-optimal algorithm using the distributed Markov approximation technique. In particular, we extend our approach to the on-line case that can handle single-link failures promptly. The induced performance fluctuation is also studied with theoretical derivation. Finally, extensive experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of proposed algorithm. Compared with the existing benchmark approaches, our proposed algorithm shows much better performance in terms of both efficiency in resource utilization and robustness in handling the single-link failure with fast convergence.
As part of the future work, we shall apply our framework to the data-plane of SDN networks, in which some other recovery mechanisms, such as restoration and cold-backup protection, will be further investigated.
[28] K. L. Judd, "The law of large numbers with a continuum of iid random variables," Journal of Economic theory, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 19-25, 1985. APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1 Proof: By the two conditions for state space of constructing the designed Markov chain, we see that all configurations can reach each other within a finite number of transitions, where a single in-use path is replaced in each transition. Therefore, the constructed Markov chain is irreducible, i.e., an ergodic Markov chain. Now we show that the stationary distribution of the constructed Markov chain is exactly (4) .
In the proposed Sojourn-and-Transit algorithm, the sojourn time of each configuration is exponentially distributed and the transition probability between different configurations is independent of time, so the state process constitutes a homogeneous continuous-time Markov chain. Let P r f →f ′ denote the probability that system will enter state f ′ when it leaves state f due to expiration of a count-down timer. We also introduce N f indicating the set of state which are directly connected to a state f . In Sojourn-and-Transit algorithm, the next state of f has equal probability to be any state f ′ , ∀f ′ ∈ N f . It is not hard to know the size of state space
, where s is the critical session which induces the transition from f to f ′ . Then, we
In the following, we show that the state transition rate from f to f ′ in the implemented Sojourn-and-Transit algorithm satisfies (5).
• Firstly, all the transition rates of the paths selection process are finite; • Secondly, it is straightforward to see that all path configurations can reach each other via a finite number of transitions. Therefore, the constructed Markov chain is irreducible.
• Finally, the detailed balance equation holds between any two adjacent states. Because according to (6) , given a current state f , each session counts down with a rate
then, the system leaves state f with a rate |S|λ. With probability P r f →f ′ , system jumps to an adjacent state f ′ when leaving the current state f . Therefore, we calculate the transition rate from f to f ′ as follows:
Finally, using (11) and (4), we can see
e., the detailed balance equations hold.
According to the Theorem 1.3 and Theorem 1.14 in [27] , the constructed Markov chain is time-reversible and its stationary distribution is (4).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: By referring the derivation of (4), we know the stationary distribution of the configurations inM is shown as:
, ∀g ∈ G.
Next, we analyze the distribution of configurations g ∈ G in M when link failure just occurs. As we see in the Step 2 of the Alg. 2 when link failure occurs, if there is no any session losing an in-use path, before Step 3 the distribution of g ∈ G in M is already known as:
, ∀g ∈ G;
otherwise, when any in-use path is replaced, the distribution of g ∈ G in M will become bigger than p * g . That is, we have:
By (12) and (14), we know:
where σ = ǧ∈F \G exp(−βuǧ).
Then, we calculate the d T V (q * ,q) as follows.
where A o {g ∈ G : q * g ≥q g }, and A o ⊂ G.
On the other hand, the system costs u f ∈F are independent to each other, and follow normal distribution. That is, u f ∈F are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) discrete random values and the expectation of system cost exists within the finite configuration space F . Letting this expectation denote by µ, and according to the law of large numbers [28], we have f ∈F \G exp(−βu f ) = |F \G| exp(−βµ) and f ∈F exp(−βu f ) = |F | exp(−βµ). Thus, this yields This concludes Lemma 1(a). Now we prove Lemma 1(b). Since we only consider single-link failure and each session is provided with disjointed candidate paths, the number of disappeared candidate path is at most one. That is, to each session s ∈ S 1 , the size of its candidate path space turns from |J s | to |J s | − 1. Now, we compute the total number of configurations disappeared due to the single-link failure. By the definition of S im , we know in the disappeared configurations, each session in S im selects the disappeared candidate path and other |D s |−1 candidate paths as its in-use paths. Consequently, the number of the path selection conditions for sessions in S im is calculated as c 1 = s∈Sim |Js|−1 |Ds|−1
. On the other hand, it is not hard to get the number of path selection conditions for sessions from S 1 \S im is calculated as c 2 = s∈S ⊥ |Js|−1 |Ds| . Recall that, there is no influence to any session in S\S 1 , because their candidate paths are not affected by the failed link. Similarly, the number of path selection conditions of all sessions in S\S 1 is c 3 = s∈S\S1 |Js| |Ds|
. In addition, it should be noticed that any session s ∈ S 1 can be a participant of S im . Therefore, the S im should be varied as S im ⊆ S 1 in the calculation to include all possible solutions.
Finally, we can compute the 
where |J s | ≥ 4, and is same for ∀s ∈ S. Now, we calculate the fluctuation of system cost:
On the other hand, it is not hard to find that the performance perturbation should be no greater than the cost of the worst configuration in G. Thus the upper bound will never expire u max . Finally, we have the final result shown in (2) . This concludes the proof.
